After seven waves of European Parliament elections and European Union enlargement to 27 states, the time is ripe to analyse the temporal robustness of the second-order model. We pool all the elections in a single evaluation and also look at election-by-election variations. We analyse changes in party performance over time in all EU states as well as in the 'original 10', to see whether any cross-time changes are driven by the changing composition of the EU. We also look for pan-European trends in each election, as a way identifying 'European effects' distinct from secondorder effects. There are few consistent winners and losers, although socialist parties performed worse in the last three elections than their size and government status would predict.
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Introduction: Pan-European Swings in European Parliament Elections?
The seventh set of European Parliament elections were held on June 2009. While there is evidence that 'Europe' was more prominent in the campaigns than it once might have been (Shuck et al, nd) From the point of view of understanding European Parliament elections, though, the cause of the socialists' defeat in 2009 is perhaps less significant than whether this pan-European effect was a unique occurrence. After all, there had been an alleged 'green tide' in the 1989 European Parliament elections and a sudden rise of antiEuropean parties in the 1994 elections (e.g. Curtice, 1989; Lodge, 1996; Taggart, 1998) What we consequently do in this paper is look in detail at the aggregate-level performance of parties in European Parliament elections across time. After thirty years of these elections we have almost 800 outcomes (in terms of national party voter shares) to look at. This provides a rich source of data to investigate the robustness over time of the second-order national elections model as well as whether pan-European swings between party families in particular elections can be identified.
Certainly, the European Union (EU) has changed dramatically in thirty years, both in terms of the powers of the EU and of the European Parliament itself as well as in terms of the composition of the EU. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first focus on the two standard second-order effects across time: (1) the performance of governments, and (2) the effect of party size. We then turn to party families, and whether there were any party-family swings in particular elections, and whether there are any systematic party-family trends over time.
Second-Order Effects: Governing Status and Party Size
Because European Parliament elections do not lead to the formation of a government, these contests are far less important for voters, the media and national politicians than are elections for national parliaments. The standard 'second-order national elections' model consequently posits that European Parliament elections are relatively low salience contests, fought in the shadow of the contest for the main (first-order) national election by the same parties as contest national elections, with a subsequent focus on the national arena rather than European level issues, the performance of the political groups in the European Parliament, or the policy positions of national parties towards the EU. At micro level, this encourages voters to behave differently from how they would if a national parliament election were held at the same time. The fact that a national government is not being elected frees them to express their opposition to a particular government, or to vote sincerely, by supporting their most-preferred (small) party rather than their second or third most-preferred (large) party which has a chance of winning a national parliament election; or to signal their preferences on a particular policy issue they care about which the main parties are ignoring, such as the environment, or immigration (cf. Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Marsh, 1998; Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004 not demonstrate the truth of the underlying micro-level assumptions. We will return to this point in our conclusion.
To investigate the first of hypothesis, Figure 1 is not linked to the electoral cycle is the way it once was (e.g. Marsh, 1998) . One way of interpreting this pattern is that there was a novelty effect during the first European Parliament elections, as a result of widespread excitement and media coverage surrounding the first experiment in supranational democracy (e.g. Blumler and Fox, 1980) . This effect may have continued, although to a lesser extent, in each new country that joined in the EU and held their first elections to the European Parliament. But after these novelty effects had worn off, the standard second-order effect kicks in and has remained pretty stable over 25 years.
Furthermore, this changing cross-time effect cannot be explained by the altered composition of the EU. There are only small differences in the trends shown in Figure 2A (for all EU countries) and Figure In general, over the past 30 years, despite the increasing policy competences of the EU and the increasing powers of the European Parliament to shape outcomes on these policies, swings against national governments have actually increased in European Parliament elections rather than decreased. The enlargement of the EU from 10 to 27 member states in this period has not had any major effect on this general pattern.
While the losses suffered by government parties could be due to a secondorder effect, it could also be that governments are simply paying the price of being in government, and that these looses are simply a forerunner of what is in store for them at the next election. The weakness of a clear cyclical pattern is perhaps more in accord with a more significant decline in government support than a temporary loss.
Schmitt (2009) visible at the aggregate level: with very large parties losing more votes than mediumsized parties, and small parties gaining votes compared to both medium-sized parties and large parties (cf. Marsh, 1998; Hix and Marsh, 2007) . Also, although this effect is stronger for governing parties than opposition parties, it is nonetheless apparent, though weaker, for opposition parties too. In other words, large parties lose votes in European Parliament elections, while small parties gain votes, regardless of whether these parties are in government or opposition.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Having presented the pooled analysis of the effect of party size on performance on European Parliament elections, Figure 4 looks at this effect for each election separately, for all EU member states. Here, the same regression model is estimated and plotted separately for each European Parliament election, for parties in government compared to parties in opposition. The full results of these models are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix.
[Figures 4 about here]
The main second-order effect is robust across all the elections, in that large parties did worse than small parties. Nevertheless, there are some interesting election-specific differences, particularly in relation to government/opposition differences in the impact of party size. For example, in the third European Parliament elections, in 1989, the effect of being in government was not particularly strong, in that large parties in both government and opposition lost similar amounts of votes.
But, in each set of elections since then, the effect of party size on election performance for governing parties as opposed to opposition parties has been consistent.
[ Figure 5 about here] M A N U S C R I P T Figure 5 investigates the same patterns but only for the parties in the original 10 countries (see Table A5 in the Appendix for the full results of the models). Recall that the aim, here, is to investigate whether the varying cross-time patterns in Figure 4 are driven by enlargement of the EU to states where European Parliament elections work differently from how they work in the original 10 states. Indeed, comparing As a first take on this, Table 1 [ Table 1 about here]
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This might be considered to mark an important qualification with respect to the validity of the second order model. However, as the final column of the table shows -which looks at party-family specific residuals from applying a pooled second-order election model -the party family effects are much smaller once the second-order national election effects are taken into account (from the model in Table   A1 in the Appendix). Specifically, once one controls for whether a party is in government, the size of a party (in terms of its vote-share in the previous national 
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was the case, Figure 6 plots the average performance of each party family in each election (the party-family specific residuals), controlling for other second-order effects, namely the size of a party and whether it was in government or opposition (see Table A4 for the full results of the models).
9
[ Figure 6 about here]
The typical patterns in the second column of Table 1 another way, in these two sets of elections, socialist parties did even worse than they should have done, given that they were in government and were generally large 9 For Figure 6 the residuals are plotted from the model in Table A3 in the Appendix. In these box plots, (Tukey 1977 ) the black dots in the middle of each box are the median effects, the right and left of the boxes are the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distributions, respectively, the ends of the 'whiskers' mark plus/minus 1.5*the median (or if these are smaller, the extreme cases) and the outliers beyond these points are indicated with dots. 10 The average gain in 1989 was 4.1 per cent, the biggest win for green parties in any of the seven elections, but the residual gain is only 1.5 per cent. In four of the seven elections greens made residual gains of less than 1 per cent.
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parties. In addition, socialist parties in opposition lost more votes in the 1979, 1999 and 2009 elections than a standard second-order model predictions. In other words, in these elections, socialist parties in opposition should on average have lost votes because they were large parties, yet should not have lost as many votes as they did because they were in opposition rather than in government.
[ Figure 8 about here] Finally, to investigate the effect of enlargement on party family performance in European Parliament elections, Figure 8 presents the same information as in Figure   6 , but this time only for the parties from the original 10 member states. 11 In general, the patterns in the original 10 countries are similar to the average patterns, which again suggest that on average the changing composition of the EU has not altered the way European Parliament elections work. Several differences do stand out, though.
In particular, on average socialist parties lost more votes in the 2009 elections in the original 10 member states than they did in the other 17 member states, controlling for whether these parties were in government or opposition and their vote-share in the preceding national election.
Conclusion
We now have enough data to look at the second-order model of European Parliament elections in a more nuanced way, rather than simply pooling across all elections and all countries. While the number of cases for analysis in any one election remain quite small, it is important to consider how far the major aspects of the second-order model are consistent across time. This cross-time analysis of the basic model is one new aspect introduced by this paper. A second new element is the examination of panEuropean political trends across time, as well as election-specific pan-European swings between party families, as a way of trying to identify particular 'European effects' distinct from the general second-order national effects.
Regarding the general cross-time analysis, we find that the basic second-order model is fairly robust across all sets of elections, in that parties in government and large parties have tended to be badly in all European Parliament elections.
11 For Figure 8 the residuals are plotted from the first model in Table A5 in the Appendix.
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Interestingly, the 1979 election was the least second-order, but the 'novelty factor' wore off quickly. This is certainly not to suggest that there have not been variations over time that would in many cases be significant statistically (indicated in the Appendix). But, in substantive terms, the patterns identified in our analysis, and earlier analyses of these elections, are quite consistent. Furthermore, restricting analysis to the same set of states, the 'original 10', does not lend any support to the view that the elections are becoming either more, or less, second-order as a result of enlargement of the EU. Essentially, the enlargement of the EU has not had any Note: Unclassified parties excluded. The 'mean residual' is the residual effect of each party family once governing status, party size, and national election cycle effects are taken into account. The general second-order model results are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix Note: The dependent variable in these models is government vote change between the preceding national general election and the European Parliament election, summed for all parties in government in a country. Time is a normalised continuous variable, ranging from 0 to 1, which measures the timing of a European Parliament election in a national election cycle. Observations when European Parliament elections were held at the same time as national general elections (if Time = 1) were dropped. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: See footnote to Table A2 for a description of the variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 M A N U S C R I P T Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See the note to Table A1 for a description of the variables.
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